Visit from Yuriy Timofeyev

Last week our lab, and PhD students enjoyed a quiet seminar by Yuriy Timofeyev, Associate Professor of Management at the Graduate School of Business, HSE University in Moscow, Russia.

Yuriy Timofeyev is an Associate Professor of Management at Graduate School of Business, HSE University (Moscow, Russia). He holds a doctoral degree from Frankfurt School of Finance and Management (Germany). He also received a Candidate of Science degree in Economics and Diploma with distinction in Economic Theory from Volgograd State University (Russia). Timofeyev’s research interests focus on ethical issues in managerial economics and healthcare. In particular, he studies causes and consequences of different types of unethical behavior using experimental and empirical data, respectively. Timofeyev’s research projects were supported by several grants; he was a Principal Investigator for a prestigious research grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Timofeyev is a Deputy Editor of The International Journal of Health Planning and Management (Wiley).

Timofeyev presented his paper, “Experimental evidence on the impact of communication and veto power in groups on willingness to violate social norms” (with Prof. Eberhard Feess).

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate how the willingness to violate social norms is influenced by communication and veto rights in groups. We frame the violation of social norms as the possibility to transfer money designated for donation to the own account. Veto rights are implemented by assuming that the transfer probability decreases from fifty percent to zero in case the two group members disagree. Our most important result is that veto rights increase the willingness to take the money to such a large degree that the positive effect of veto rights is overcompensated. Thus, veto rights against the violation of social norms fire back by leading to a mental free-rider behavior. Furthermore, communication in groups reduces the violation frequency with veto rights, but increases it without veto rights. The comparison of individual-to group decision making depends on the institutional setting in groups. Higher amounts are transferred less often.